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ABSTRACT 
The author discusses the problem of integration of first- and third-person approaches in studying the 
human mind. She critically evaluates and compares various methodologies for studying and explaining 
conscious experience. Common strategies that apply reductive explanation seem to be unsatisfied for 
explaining experience and its subjective character. There were attempts to explain experience from the 
first-person point of view (introspectionism, philosophical phenomenology) but the results were not 
intersubjectively verifiable. Dennett proposed heterophenomenology as a scientifically viable alternative 
which supposed to bridge the gap between first- and third-person perspectives. The author critically 
evaluates his proposal and compares it to contemporary attempts to provide first-person methods. 
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Cognitive science has a relatively short history, if compared to established scientific 
disciplines that are participating in this interdisciplinary science of the mind: neuroscience, 
psychology, computer science, linguistics, evolutionary biology, anthropology, educational 
sciences and philosophy. Josés Luiz Bermúdez stresses that “[T]he job of cognitive science is 
to provide a framework for bringing all these different perspectives together” [1; p.xviii]. 
This is far from being an easy job, and cognitive scientists from different disciplinary 
backgrounds are dealing with concrete questions on how to combine different approaches and 
methodologies in their research. David Marr [2] famously proposed three levels of analysis 
(computational level, algorithmic/representational level and physical level) with the 
corresponding methods, and thus suggested the model of integration in classical cognitive 
science. Later approaches to cognitive modelling (connectionism, neural networks) and the 
much more important role of neuroscience reopens the problem of how to build coherent 
interdisciplinary theories. Valery Hardcastle in her book How to Build a Theory in Cognitive 
Science suggested that the answer to this conundrum revolves “around the common 
explanatory patterns one finds in cognitive science” and the shared interest in explaining how 
information is processed [3; p.9]. She is aware that what counts as information and how 
different scientists explain it is not uniform across disciplines composing cognitive science. 
But it seems to me that if we stick with Bermúdez and his “short, but accurate, definition of 
cognitive science: Cognitive science is the science of the mind” [2; p.1], the problems of 
integration are much harder. Namely, many philosophers of mind and cognitive science (e.g. 
Nagel [4], Chalmers [5], Varela [6, 7]) have pointed out that cognitive scientists, if they 
really want to explain the mental, they have to find the way how to deal with the experience 
and subjective aspects of consciousness. They emphasize that cognitive science has been 
neglecting the experiential. 
Let me elaborate a bit on the philosophy of psychology from the historical and theoretical 
perspective. Elisabeth Valentine compares different frameworks in psychology with respect 
to three different aspects: the subject matter, the methods prescribed and the preferred 
theoretical analysis [8; p.128]. She suggests that the subject matter – conscious experience, 
behaviour and physiology - provide three different types of data and further determine the 
methods and theoretical analysis. She points out that the famous question “how to get inside 
the head” can be answered by three different methods roughly associated with three subject 
matters: asking (introspection) with conscious experience, guessing (inferences from 
behaviour) with behaviour and looking (neuroscience) with physiology [8; pp.128-129]. Both 
behaviourism and cognitive science (classical and connectionist) are dealing with explaining 
behaviour, but they use different methods and theoretical analyses. Behaviourism is studying 
behaviour through objective observation and experiments using functional analysis in terms 
of stimulus-response relations. Classical and connectionist cognitive science study systems 
governing behaviour and use the computational model of mind, applying functional analysis 
and describing mental processes in terms of information processing [8; p.131]. Valentine, with 
a very broad brush, suggests that “there are three main psychological approaches to explain 
mental phenomena: the experiential, the behavioural and the neurophysiological” [8; p.137]. 
The experiential approach includes traditions of Verstehen, phenomenology, folk psychology 
and introspectionism. They tend to adopt a subjective and an individualistic approach with 
the focus on the subject’s (first-person) perspective and explanation in terms of beliefs, 
desires, and reasons. The behavioural approach encompasses both behaviourism and 
cognitive psychology. It is based on the functionalist theory of mind and attempts to provide 
a causal analysis of the processes in the system. In contrast to the previous one, this approach 
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is objective and general, as is the next, neurophysiological approach. At the level of 
neuroscience the task is to provide explanations in terms of physical embodiment. 
Daniel Dennett describes three different stances: intentional stance, design stance and 
physical stance [2], that roughly correspond to the division above. He argues that these 
stances help us explain and predict behaviour at different levels of abstraction, the physical 
stance at the most concrete level and intentional stance at the most abstract level, 
corresponding to folk psychology. He also suggests that with the method of 
heterophenomenology he is able to provide a scientifically respectable approach to conscious 
experience. Heterophenomenology has provoked a lot of discussion and disagreement, but 
before focusing on his method let us briefly look at Nagel’s and Chalmers’ understanding of 
conscious experience and the possible science of consciousness. 
NAGEL AND CHALMERS ON CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
David Chalmers opens his paper “Facing Up the Problem of Consciousness” with the 
following observation: “Consciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the 
mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is 
nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental phenomena have yielded to scientific 
investigation in recent years, but consciousness has stubbornly resisted” [9; p.200]. What he 
sees as the most perplexing problem – famously hailed as “the hard problem of 
consciousness” – is the problem of experience, the subjective aspect of mental processes. He 
argues that in contrast to the “easy problems of consciousness” (e.g. the reportability of 
mental states, the focus of attention, the deliberate control of behaviour etc.) which concern 
the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions, the hard problem is not a problem about 
the performance of functions. Easy problems may be solvable by the methods of cognitive 
science and neuroscience, but even if one manages to successfully explain the performance of 
cognitive or behavioural functions (e.g. verbal report, perceptual discrimination), Chalmers 
feels it will still be unclear as to why exactly the performance of these functions should be 
accompanied by experience [9]. Or, in Thomas Nagel’s words, “the fact that an organism has 
conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that 
organism” [4; p.166]. Nagel stresses the subjective character of conscious experience. Only 
creatures that undergo similar experiences can understand this “what is like to be” in an 
empathetic sense. So, famously, because of a differences in sensory apparatus and consequently 
in perception, there is no reason to believe that we can feel what is like to be a bat. Nagel 
argues that facts about consciousness can be only incompletely understood from an outside, 
third-person perspective. Knowledge gained from the external, objective, third-person 
perspective of the natural sciences or cognitive sciences would thus, according to Nagel, not 
suffice to understand what the bat can understand of its own experience from its internal first-
person subjective point of view. This epistemic form of subjectivity is associated with limits 
on the knowability and understandability about conscious experience [10]. 
We see that both authors emphasize the subjectivity of conscious experience and are 
concerned especially with the qualitative character of consciousness or qualia, sometimes 
also called phenomenal consciousness [11]. According to Block, phenomenal consciousness 
properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions, and also 
thoughts, wants and emotions. He maintains that these properties differ from any cognitive, 
intentional, or functional property belonging to what he calls access consciousness. Nagel, 
Chalmers and Block stress that feelings escape functional explanations of cognitive science. 
In the words of Joe Levine, there is the so-called “explanatory gap” [12] between causal 
explanation from the third-person perspective and the first-person experience of how it feels. 
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Nagel and Chalmers deny the possibility of a reductive explanation of conscious experience 
because reductive theories lack resources to give an answer to “what is like to be” [4] or the 
“hard problem” [9]. But they both speculate about the possible solution. Chalmers argues that 
to account for conscious experience we would need “an extra ingredient” in the explanation. 
His suggestion is that we have to take experience as the fundamental feature of the world and 
construct a theory of experience with the aid of new psychophysical principles that will 
supplement physical theory. He further speculates about the double-aspect of information as 
the basic principle that might underlie and explain the emergence of experience from the 
physical. According to the double-aspect hypothesis, experience arises by virtue of its 
phenomenal aspect, while physical aspect is embodied in physical processing [9]. Nagel ends 
his seminal paper “What Is It Like to be a Bat?" with the following speculative proposal: “It 
may be possible to approach the gap between subjective and objective from another direction. 
Setting aside temporarily the relation between the mind and the brain, we can pursue a more 
objective understanding of the mental in its own right. At present we are completely 
unequipped to think about the subjective character of experience without relying on the 
imagination - without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be 
regarded as a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method - an objective 
phenomenology not dependent on empathy or imagination..... Apart from its own interest, a 
phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physical basis 
of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that 
admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective 
explanations of a more familiar sort” [4; pp.178-179]. 
METHODOLOGIES FOR STUDYING CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE 
So, are there any concrete proposals on how to scientifically study conscious experience and 
integrate the first- and third-person perspectives? Is it possible to improve the standard 
methods used in science or do we have to develop new ones? How are new attempts 
connected to the more traditional approaches to studying experience? 
Let me start with Dennett’s illustration of two opposing teams tackling the problem of 
explaining experience. Dennett starts off with the two questions, posed by his colleague 
James Conant [13; p.1]: 
Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, 
perception or dream? 
Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the 
conditions for the possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?  
Dennett adds a third version of the question: 
Turing: How could we make a robot that had thoughts, that learned from “experience” 
(interacting with the world) and used what it learned the way we can do? 
Dennett suggests there are two main reactions to Turing’s proposal to trade in Kant’s 
question for him: 
(A) Cool! Turing has found a way to actually answer Kant’s question! 
(B) Aaaargh! Don’t fall for it! You’re leaving out . . . experience! 
Dennett declares himself as a captain of the A team (together with Quine, Rorty, Hofstadter, 
the Churchlands, Andy Clark and others), while Chalmers is a supposed captain of the B 
team. He thinks that his team will win, but admits that it will not be an easy task. It will take 
“a rather remarkable exercise of the imagination to see how it might even be possible”, but 
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following Turing’s insight on how to recast Kant’s question as an “engineering question” he 
thinks it will be possible to “trade in the first-person perspective of Descartes and Kant for 
the third-person perspective of the natural sciences and answer all the questions–without 
philosophically significant residue” [13; p.1]. On the other side, Chalmers, together with 
Nagel, Searle, Levine and others, insists that he just knows that A team leaves out 
consciousness and does not address the hard problem. 
So, let us look first at Dennett’s heterophenomenology, and then turn to first person methods 
in the science of consciousness. 
HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY 
Dennett develops heterophenomenology as a method for studying consciousness and 
describes it in the 4
th
 chapter of Consciousness Explained as “the neutral path leading from 
objective physical science and its insistence on the third-person point of view, to a method of 
phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and 
ineffable subjective experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of 
science” [8; p.72]. In his later paper, he characterized it as “a bridge – the bridge – between 
the subjectivity of human consciousness and the natural sciences” [14; p.249]. He thinks that 
heterophenomenology preserves the point of view of the subject (first-person perspective) 
and then conveys it to science (third-person perspective). He argues that it takes the subjects 
seriously, but without granting them infallibility, in contrast to the Cartesian tradition which 
he calls a “lone-wolf autophenomenology”. The distinguishing character of the method is 
neutrality, a kind of agnosticism, “a deliberate bracketing of the issue of whether what they 
are saying is literally true, metaphorically true, true under-an-imposed-interpretation, or 
systematically-false-in-a-way-we-must-explain” [14; p.252] that is contrary to what we are 
used to in our everyday interpersonal communication. 
The investigator starts the research by extracting verbal utterances that are transcribed and 
function as verbal reports. The method, however, is not limited solely to verbal reports, but 
may also include other types of data, such as behavioral reactions, visceral reactions, 
hormonal reactions, and other changes in physical states that are detectable by objective 
means. Dennett points out that the investigator has to be particularly cautious with verbal 
reports, since they require interpretation and assessment of speech acts as expressions of 
beliefs about a subject’s subjective state. Verbal reports represent the most critical part and 
require the employment of the intentional stance as well as the move from raw data to 
interpreted data - subject’s heterophenomenological word [13]. Dennett stresses that his 
fictional world is populated with all the images, events, sounds, smells, hunches, presentiments, 
and feelings that the subject (apparently) sincerely believes to exist in his or her (or its) stream 
of consciousness. Maximally extended, it is a neutral portrayal of exactly what it is like to be 
that subject–in the subject’s own terms, given the best interpretation we can muster” [2; p.98]. 
Dennett suggests that heterophenomenologists can, by carefully designing their 
investigations, bring data from the first-person point of view to objective science. He feels he 
has not discovered a new method, but has merely described and explained it. He considers it 
to be a “good old 3
rd
-person scientific method applied to the particular phenomena of human 
(and animal) consciousness“ [13]. Scientists in various disciplines (e.g. psychophysicists, 
cognitive psychologists) that intend to study consciousness in a scientific way have already 
used it. Heterophenomenology also takes some features from philosophical 
phenomenological tradition (Brentano, Husserl) but in a naturalized variant. What is the 
exact relationship between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and classical philosophical 
phenomenology is the topic of much heated discussion [15]. But before that, let us give a 
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word to the members of the team B who believe that heterophenomenologists leave out what 
they need to explain – the subjective experience. 
FIRST PERSON METHODS 
On the first sight Chalmers has radically different views about possible methods for the 
science of consciousness then Dennett. He argues that the job of a science of consciousness is 
to connect first-person data to third-person data [16]. The latter are obtained by investigating 
processes like behaviour, brain processes and environmental interactions that are accessible 
by known scientific methods. First person data are about conscious experience an include 
those concerning visual experience (e.g. the experience of colour), other perceptual 
experiences (e.g. auditory, tactile), bodily experience (e.g. pain), mental imagery (e.g. recalled 
visual images), emotional experience (e.g. happiness, fear), and concurrent thought (e.g. the 
experience of deciding) [17]. Chalmers takes for granted that there are first-person data – it is 
a fact about our minds, and that “our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from 
our first-person access to them” [16]. He has argued that reductive strategies to explain 
conscious experiences are doomed to fail [5, 9]. Even if scientist find out the complete 
functional explanation there will still remain the question why is this functioning associated 
with the particular subjective experience. First-person data are not data about objective 
functioning. Scientists are thus facing the problem to find good methodologies for collecting 
the data (both first-and third-person), express them in suitable language and find connecting 
principles. Chalmers’ goal is to find “fundamental theory of consciousness”, i.e. formulate 
simple and universal laws that underlie these connecting principles [16, 17]. In order to 
possibly achieve the goal scientists have to develop methods in both domains. 
There was a fascinating development of methods in psychology and especially in 
neuroscience (e.g. brain imaging, single cell studies) in last few decades, as well as 
improvement in expressing data (e.g. computational models, statistics). It therefore seems 
that science about the third-person domain is well equipped. But what about the first-person 
domain? Do we have well developed methods for gathering first-person data? There were 
traditions in the experiential approach, especially introspectionism and philosophical 
phenomenology that nearly disappear from scientific investigation of the mind. But they are 
now coming back, transformed and accompanied with many new first-person approaches to 
the study of consciousness, including those, based on a Eastern meditative tradition [18]. 
Nevertheless we have to take into account the well known obstacles: the lack of incorrigible 
access to experience, the changing of experience while we self-observe and the difficulties 
with expressing in language. 
What I find perplexing is how two approaches, introspectionism and phenomenology are 
sometimes merged in new first person methods. I think the names phenomenal consciousness 
and phenomenal properties may provoke some misunderstanding by conflating qualitative 
and phenomenal structure [10]. According to phenomenologists from Brentano on, the 
phenomenal structure of experience is much more then raw feels and covers the domain of 
the world as it appears to us. It involves not only sensory qualities but also intentionality. 
Introspection was introduced by Wilhelm Wundt as a psychological method where “one 
attends carefully to one’s own sensation and reports them as objectively as possible” [19, p.103]. 
This means that one describes the felt sensation and not the stimulus that provoke it. In a 
way, the introspectionists were studying the elements of sensation and looking for the basic 
constituents of mental states. On the other hand, for Brentano, the early phenomenologist, 
psychology starts with the mind–an active, creative entity which has intentions, for it implies 
and demands an object. The true subject matter of psychology is the mental act–such as 
judging, sensing, imagining, or hearing, each of which reflects a sense of direction and 
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purpose. One cannot simply see; one must see something; and the act of seeing something is 
psychological or mental. Given this viewpoint, the task of empirical psychology is to study 
the mind of the agent at work, dealing with objects, purposes, and goals. ... one cannot 
conceive of thoughts and judgement, let alone study them, except by taking into account 
one’s inner phenomenal experience. And this can be accessed not by prompted introspection 
– for one cannot observe at the same time that one experiences–but rather by simple 
phenomenal experience of one’s inner mental life” [19; pp.101-102]. 
We can clearly see the difference between bottom-up approach of introspectionism and top-
down phenomenological approach of Brentano. As Howard Gardner has pointed out, his top-
down concerns are emerging in different forms, also in the view of the computer as an agent 
with plans, intentions, and goals [19; p.102]. On the other side, we can understand why with 
the more accurate measurements of brain activity neuroscientists are interested in more fine-
grained descriptions of experience that can be linked to neural correlates. As Nahmias 
reflects: “Given the new tools we have to test and correlate the conscious experiences 
reported by subjects, should we shake off the shackles of behaviorism and reconsider some of 
the introspectionists’ methods and goals? Specifically, might it be worthwhile (1) to try to 
train subjects to attend more closely to their experiences and describe them more fully and 
accurately; (2) to try to develop a more precise language with which subjects can report the 
contents of conscious experience; and ultimately, (3) to try to map out the internal structure 
of conscious experience to better understand its relations to neural processes” [20; p.12].  
Let me illustrate the idea of correlating subjective experience and neural state with an 
experiment done by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues [21, 22] . They set 
about to study the neurobiological substrates of feelings by connecting first-person 
experiences with third-person data obtained by modern imaging techniques. First, he and his 
team made sure that they were actually capable of triggering emotions in their test subjects. 
They asked them to recall a certain emotional situation in which they experienced one of the 
four feelings: joy, sorrow, fear or anger, and then to re-experience this emotion as vividly as 
possible. The experiment was then taken to the second room where test subjects were placed 
in a PET scanner. They were asked to imagine the past experience again and then signal with 
their hands when the required emotion was experienced. At that point the activity of their 
brains was recorded with the PET scanner, which eventually provided appropriate brain 
correlates for certain emotive states. The obtained results corroborated their hypothesis that in 
experiencing emotions there was high neural activity in the somatosensory parts of the brain 
(cingulate cortes, insula and SII, hypothalamus and several nuclei in the brain stem 
tegmentum), and at the same time activation/deactivation patterns for different feelings 
differed substantially. So, just as we can perceive that our bodies are in different states when 
we experience fear or joy, Damasio and his colleagues successfully showed that brain maps 
corresponding to these feelings also differ. 
But is this approach really so different from Dennett’s heterophenomenology? I think that 
Dennett would accept experiments like Damasio’s without problems. The important 
difference between hetrophenomenology and first person methodologies described by Varela 
and Shear [18] is in the preparation of persons that are doing first person research. Persons 
doing introspection or phenomenological inquiry are trained to do this (see also Kordeš, this 
issue), while Dennett rely on ordinary people. He thus suggests that “if some of your 
conscious experiences occur unbeknownst to you (if they are experiences about which you 
have no beliefs, and hence can make no “verbal judgments”), then they are just as 
inaccessible to your first-person point of view as they are to heterophenomenology. Ex 
hypothesi, you don’t even suspect you have them – if you did, you could verbally express 
those suspicions. So heterophenomenology’s list of primary data doesn’t leave out any 
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conscious experiences you know of, or even have any first-person inklings about” [13]. On the 
other side at least some first person methods are concerned with pre-reflexive experience and 
see the role of introspection in explicating what was only implicitly present. Since this part of 
our knowledge is non-conscious and thus difficult to get at, Pierre Vermersch and Claire 
Petitmengin-Peugeot propose the explication session with an interviewer. Interviewer guides 
the subject through three stages: gathering descriptions of experiences, analysis and modelling 
of the descriptions and comparing the established models. The accessing the experience can 
be relieving a past experience or living the experience ‘in the present [23, 24; p.46]. In seems 
that guidance and help from well trained interviewer – second-person, is crucial for such an 
investigation and that “naive” introspection will not lead to interesting results. But who wants 
to stick to naïve introspection if there are better methods. 
CONCLUSION 
Common strategy in science is to apply reductive explanation but it is highly problematic if 
the same strategy can be used also in cognitive science, particularly in science of 
consciousness. Nagel and Chalmers have argued that because of the special qualitative 
character that accompany experience which is always subjective and from first-person 
perspective, strategies for explaining experiences must be different. We know from the 
beginning of psychology that there were attempts for a scientific approach to explain 
experience (introspectionism, philosophical phenomenology). Because the results were not 
intersubjectively verifiable scientist were highly sceptical about such methods. Dennett 
proposed heterophenomenology as a scientifically viable alternative, which supposed to be a 
bridge between first-and third- person perspectives. I think this method is quite similar to some 
new introspective methods although the ideology behind often points otherwise. I understand 
all of them more pragmatically as tools for obtaining more systematic and deeper knowledge 
of our mental life that can be possibly correlated with the functioning neural system but I 
doubt that any of the proposed methods can help Chalmers to solve the hard problem. 
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SAŽETAK 
Autorica diskutira o problemu integracije perspektiva prvog i trećeg lica u proučavanju ludskog uma. Ona 
kritički procjenjuje i uspoređuje različite metodologije proučavanja i objašnjavanja iskustva svijesti. Uobičajena 
strategija, primjena redukcionističkog objašnjenja, nije zadovoljavajuća za objašnjavanje iskustva i njegovog 
subjektivnog karaktera. Pokušaji objašnjavanja iskustva iz perspektive prvog lica (introspekcionizam, filozofska 
fenomenologija) ne mogu se intersubjektivno verificirati. Dennett je predložio heterofenomenologiju kao 
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Autorica kritički razmatra njegov prijedlog i uspoređuje ga sa suvremenim pokušajima za formuliranje metoda 
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